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This paper discusses whether some propositions concerning the effects of indirect tax harmonization that have been
derived when taxes are levied on a destination basis and revenue is returned to the individuals as a lump-sum transfer
can, when accurately reformulated, be extended to a framework where commodities are taxed according to the origin
principle and the governments use their revenue to finance the purchase of goods and services. Using a two-country
model, it is argued that a non-uniform proportional convergence of domestic taxes towards a properly designed «av-
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1. Introduction
Some of the contributions in the recent literature on multilateral tax reforms have fo-
cused on the discussion of the welfare effects arising from indirect tax harmonization poli-
cies [Keen (1987, 1989), Turunen-Red and Woodland (1990), Keen and Lahiri (1993),
Kanbur and Keen (1993), López-García (1996)]. The main ideas emerging from this litera-
ture are that, under «normal» circumstances, there exist harmonizing reforms that generate a
potential Pareto improvement, and that there are «exceptional» situations under which those
reforms are also actually Pareto improving. In the models underlying these contributions
taxes are levied according to the destination principle (under which taxes are paid in the
country where the good is consumed) and it is usually assumed that tax revenue is returned to
the individuals as a lump-sum transfer. As expected, this assumption emerges as one of the
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Subsequent papers by Delipalla (1997), Lockwood (1997), Lahiri and Raimondos-
Møller (1998) and López-García (1998) have discussed the effects of a number of harmoniz-
ing rules in the presence of revenue requirements or provision of public goods in a variety of
frameworks. Although there are important differences in these models (concerning the struc-
ture of the model itself and the assumptions about public goods production), it can be in-
ferred from them that there may still be a welfare case for harmonization even where govern-
ments use tax revenue to finance public goods. All these papers continue to assume that
commodity taxes are levied on a destination basis.
In 1997, the European Comission proposed a radical reform of indirect (i.e. value-
added) taxation that, in essence, can be decomposed in two parts. On the one hand, a shift
from the current destination principle to the origin principle (under which taxes are paid in
the country where the good is produced). On the other, harmonization of tax rates across
member states. This objective, however, emerges as a long-term one. In the meanwhile, there
exists some kind of mixed system, in which the destination system is maintained for transac-
tions between firms but cross-border purchases by individuals are actually taxed on an origin
basis.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss whether some propositions referring to indirect
tax harmonization derived from models with taxation according to the destination principle
and with revenue returned to the consumers as lump-sum transfers, can also be extended to a
situation where taxes are levied on an origin basis and where governments use their revenue
to finance the purchase of goods and services. The model is midway between Keen’s (1987,
1989) and some of those reviewed above. It is simpler in so much as that it ignores the opti-
mal provision of public goods, and, as in Delipalla (1997), international transfers both be-
tween individuals and between governments are assumed to be feasible. The effects of indi-
rect tax harmonization under the origin principle in the presence of public goods have
recently been analyzed by Lucas (2001) in a model similar to that used in Lahiri and
Raimondos-Møller (1998), i.e., with world consumer prices taken as exogenous. His harmo-
nizing rule, however, is actually that advanced in López-García (1996), which is a particular
case of the one introduced below.
This paper also has another objective. In López-García (1996) a parallel is drawn be-
tween the effects of harmonization under both principles. One of the limitations of this anal-
ysis, however, is that tax revenue is returned to the individuals in each country as a transfer.
A related paper, López-García (1998), discusses whether some propositions concerning the
effects of harmonization (under the destination principle) when tax receipts are returned to
the consumers may also apply when they are used to finance government demands. A further
aim of this paper is, therefore, to verify whether we can extend the above-mentioned parallel
to the present context. This extrapolation does not seem to be a direct one. As much is in-
ferred in a recent paper by Keen, Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (2002). They argue that the
results on indirect tax harmonization in Keen and Lahiri (1993), extending those in the com-
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where taxes are levied on a destination basis, do not hold under the origin principle. In partic-
ular, they show that, abstracting from revenue effects, harmonization under the destination
principle is a potential Pareto improvement, but harmonization under the origin principle
may be (i.e., it will be under some circumstances) Pareto-worsening.
Using a two-country model, it is argued that a family of indirect tax harmonization poli-
cies, to be precise a non-uniform proportional convergence of domestic taxes towards an ap-
propriately designed «average» tax structure, can be characterized as potentially Pareto-im-
proving. However, these reforms will not, in general, lead to an actual Pareto-improvement,
where each country is better off without any need for offsetting international transfers. Fur-
thermore, this result does not depend on whether or not the initial position is a Nash equilib-
rium, which constrasts with the case where tax revenue is returned to the consumers as a
transfer.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The framework and the assumptions of the
model are set up in section 2. Section 3 provides a general characterization of multilateral tax
reforms. Section 4 discusses Nash equilibrium tax structures, in which each country deploys
its taxes under the assumption that the other one will not modify its actions. Section 5 ex-
plores the notion of harmonizing reforms, and analyzes those implying a non-uniform pro-
portional convergence of domestic taxes towards an appropriately designed target structure.
Sections 6 and 7 present two propositions concerning the welfare and revenue effects of the
harmonizing rules presented in section 5, focusing on whether they result in a potential or an
actual Pareto-improvement. Section 8 summarizes with some final comments.
2. A model of international trade
The framework for the analysis is a standar model of international trade where two coun-
tries, labelled as «home» and «abroad», trade in N + 1 commodities, indexed as 0, 1, ..., N
[see, for instance, Dixit and Norman (1980)]. The variables referring to the home (foreign)
country are represented by small (capital) letters. The distributional questions within each
country are ignored, and a single, representative consumer is taken to exist in each of them.
Consumer behaviour is characterized by means of the expenditure functions e(q0, q, u) and
E(Q0, Q, U), where q0 (Q0) and q (Q) denote consumer prices of goods 0 and 1, ..., N, and u
(U) the utility level. By well-known duality properties, the compensated demand functions
for the N + 1 commodities are given by e0(q0, q, u) and eq(q0, q, u) for the home country and
E0(Q0, Q, U) and EQ(Q0, Q, U) for the foreign one, where the subscripts denote partial deriv-
atives.
As far as production is concerned, it is assumed that there is only one representative firm
in each country, whose technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale, and which oper-
ates in conditions of perfect competition. Its behaviour can be resumed in the profit functions
 = (p0, p) and  = (P0, P), where p0 (P0) and p (P) are producer prices in each country.
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and 0(P0, P) and P(P0, P) for the foreign one.
There is a government in each country with a revenue requirement expressed in terms of
physical units of the N + 1 commodities, g0 (G0) and g (G). For the sake of simplicity, and
specifically in order to avoid the issues associated with the optimal provision of public
goods, government demands are not included in consumer preferences. The tax instruments
available to each government are commodity taxes, expressed as specific taxes, t0 (T0) and
t (T), as well as taxes on pure profits, levied at rates  and  in each of them.
The only distortions are due to indirect taxes, which are levied according to the origin
(or source) principle. Therefore, commodities are taxed at the rates prevailing in the country
where they are produced, hence it is also the one which obtains the tax revenue. As for nor-
malization, commodity 0 is considered as the numeraire and is also taken to be the untaxed
good, so that t0 = T0 = 0, and therefore q0 = Q0 = p0 = P0 = 1. As it is well-known, this entails
a loss of generality unless pure profits are taxed away, i.e., unless  =  = 1 (or with constant
returns to scale), but this ought not to be a problem in the present context.
In the absence of transport costs, the operation of the origin principle implies that con-
sumer prices will be the same in each country, q = Q. Therefore, the relationship between
non-numeraire producer prices in each country and world consumer prices can be written as:
p = q – tP = q – T [1]
so that the market-clearing conditions for the N + 1 commodities can be expressed as:
e0(1, q, u)+E0(1, q, U)+g0 + G0 = 0(1, q – t)+0(1, q – T) [2]
eq(1, q, u)+Eq(1, q, U)+g + G = p(1, q – t)+P(1, q – T) [3]
As stated in the introduction, it is assumed, as in Delipalla (1997), that international
transfers are feasible, both between governments and between individuals. If z0 stands for the
lump-sum transfer, in terms of commodity 0, from the home country’s consumer to the for-
eign’s one, their budget constraints become:
e(1, q, u) = (1 – )(1, q – t)–z0 [4]
E(1, q, U) = (1 – )(1, q – T)–z0 [5]
where (1 – )(.) and (1 – )(.) represent lump-sum income associated with after-tax pure
profits in each country. Although z0 can in principle take any sign, in one of the cases to be
discussed below this transfer is used to keep one consumer’s welfare unchanged after a mul-
tilateral reform of commodity taxation.
In both countries the government budget constraint implies equality between, on the one
hand, the expenditure associated with the amounts of the N + 1 commodities, and, on the
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transfer received from the other government:
qg + g0 = tp(1, q – t)+(1, q – t)–m0 [6]
qG + G0 = TP(1, q – t)+(1, q – T)+m0 [7]
where the symbol  denotes transposition and m0 is the transfer from the home country’s gov-
ernment to that of the foreign one. In one of the cases to be analyzed, m0 is used to maintain
one government’s fiscal resources unchanged after the tax reform 1.
According to Walras’ law we can drop the market-clearing condition [2] for the untaxed
numeraire. Therefore, the system [3]-[7] provides N + 4 equations that can be solved in N+4
unknowns. In this context two approaches emerge in a natural way. In the first of them,
which can be labelled as «reform with international transfers», given the values of the for-
eign country’s consumer utility, U, the vectors of commodity taxes, t and T, the vectors of
non-numeraire government demands, g and G, the tax rates on pure profits,  and , and the
foreign country’s demand for the numeraire, G0, the N + 4 variables are the N world relative
consumer prices, q, the home country’s consumer utility level, u, the international transfer
between consumers, z0, the home country’s consumption of the numeraire good, g0, and the
transfer between governments, m0. Since both U and G0 remain constant after the reform
(through the international transfers z0 and m0 respectively) this is the relevant approach to
discuss whether tax harmonization entails a potential Pareto-improvement.
In the second approach, which will be called «reform without international transfers»,
the parameters are the tax rates, t and T, and  and , the non-numerarie government de-
mands, g and G, and the international transfers, z0 and m0 (possibly equal to zero), and the
N+4 variables are the N world consumer prices, q, the utility levels, u and U, and the
goverment consumptions of the numeraire, g0 and G0. This sets up the appropriate frame-
work to ask whether tax harmonization can be characterized as an actual Pareto-improve-
ment, i.e, a change in which both countries are better off without any need for compensating
international transfers.
3. A characterization of multilateral tax reforms
We are now able to consider the effects of a multilateral reform of commodity taxation,
{dt,dT}, in the two situations outlined in the previous section. To simplify matters, it will be
assumed, as in Keen (1989), Delipalla (1997), Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (1998) and
López-García (1998), that there are no income effects for the N taxed commodities, i.e.:
equ = EqU =0 N [8]
where 0N is an N-vector whose components are all zero. Note here that this assumption is
equivalent to assuming that all income effects are channelled through the untaxed numeraire.
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dq =–[ ppdt + PPdT] [9]
eudu +[ eq –( 1–)p]dq +( 1–)pdt + dz0 =0 [10]
EUdU +[ Eq –( 1–)P]dq +( 1–)PdT – dz0 =0 [11]
[12]
[13]
where  = eqq + Eqq – pp – PP is the matrix of the partial derivatives of the (compensated)
world excess demands for the non-numerarie commodities. Due to its standard properties, 
is negative semi-definite, but we will also assume that there is enough substitutability in de-
mand or production between the numeraire and the other goods as to ensure that  is nega-
tive definite [see Dixit and Norman (1980, chap. 5)].
If the multilateral reform of commodity taxes, {dt,dT}, is coupled with the international
transfers dz0 and dm0 required for dU = 0 and dG0 = 0, the expressions [9]-[13] allow to ob-
tain the effects both in terms of du and dg0, in addition to dq. Eliminating dz0 and dm0 and
manipulating one can find:
[14]
[15]
as well as [9].
Alternatively, if the tax reform {dt,dT} is not combined with any international transfer,
i.e., dz0 = dm0 = 0, [9]-[13] characterize the effect on utility levels, du and dU, and the effect
on government consumption of the numeraire, dg0 and dG0, as well as the variation in world
consumer prices, dq:
eudu +[ eq –( 1–)p]dq = – (1 – )pdt [16]
EUdU +[ Eq –( 1–)P]dq = – (1 – )PdT [17]
[18]
[19]
in addition to [9] above.
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   4. Nash equilibrium tax structures
A distinction is sometimes made in the literature on indirect tax harmonization between,
on the one hand, the reforms which take as a starting point any arbitrary initial position, and,
on the other hand, those in which the initial position is a Nash equilibrium [Keen (1989),
Keen and Lahiri (1993), López-García (1996)].
At a Nash equilibrium, each country deploys its taxes in its own interest assuming that
the other one will not change its actions. The treatment of the «autonomous non-coordinated
tax policy» developed by Rose (1985) when taxes are imposed on a destination basis pro-
vides a good framework for the discussion of the optimal tax problem faced by each coun-
try 2. To carry out this analysis, we can use the so-called «expenditure function approach»
[see Dixit and Munk (1977) and Munk (1978,1980)]. Focusing on the home country, the
problem can be written as the maximization of the utility index of the consumer, subject to
the budget constraint [4], and the government budget constraint [6], as well as under the con-
dition of existence of an equilibrium. The control variables are the utility level itself, u, and
the vector of producer prices for the non-numeraire commodities, p. Consumer prices, q, are
determined endogenously through the market-clearing conditions [3], and the vector of taxes
t can be obtained directly from [1] by simple substraction.
Introducing the Lagrange multipliers  and , and omitting the international transfers z0
and m0, the relevant Lagrangean function, L(.), can be written as:
[20]
The first-order conditions with respect to p are given by:
[21]





p)eq. The coefficients of the matrix (
q/
p) provide the effects of a marginal change of
producer prices prevailing in the home country on world consumer prices (i.e., 
qi/
pj, i, j =1 ,




p)eq picks up the impact of a marginal change of p on
the home country’s consumer expenditure.
Manipulating, [21] can be rewritten as:




p)[Eq + G – P] [22]
where  =(  – )/0 is the relative marginal excess burden from distortionary taxation in
the home country. The expression (
q/
p)[Eq + G – P] captures a «terms-of-trade effect»
when setting domestic taxes, since –[Eq + G – P]=[ eq + g – p] is the vector of home (for-
eign) country’s imports (exports) of non-numeraire commodities.
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 On the other hand, the market-clearing condition [3] implicitly provides world consumer
prices, q, for given values of producer prices in the home country, p, the taxes prevailing in
the foreign country, T, the utility levels of both consumers, u and U, and the government de-
mands, g and G, i.e., q = q(p, T, u, U, g, G). Therefore, one can find:
(
q/
p)=[ eqq + Eqq – PP]–1pp [23]
Finally, manipulating in [22]-[23] and their counterparts for the foreign country ( de-
notes its relative marginal excess burden from distortionary taxation), the Nash-equilibrum
indirect tax structures, tN and TN, can be characterized as:
[24]
[25]
As reflected by [24], Nash-equilibrium taxes in a country, such as the home country, de-
pend on: (i) the demands of the representative consumer (eq); (ii) the local responses of the
aggregate demand and the supply by the foreign country (eqq + Eqq – PP); (iii) when pure
profits are not taxed away, the domestic supply (p) and its local responses (pp); and (iv) the
terms-of-trade effect through imports –[Eq + G – p]. Note here that the terms-of-trade effect
operates even when  = 1, i.e., with full taxation of pure profits (or, equivalently, with con-
stant returns to scale).
5. Non-uniform proportional convergence towards a target vector as
indirect tax harmonization
The meaning of the word «harmonization» is usually taken as a synonym for making tax
systems more «uniform». In turn, this leads to two types of considerations. First, a process of
convergence towards a common target, and, second, the suggestion that this target is deter-
mined as some «average» of the existing tax structures.
Clearly, the following family of multilateral tax reforms:
dt = [H – t] dT = [H – T] [26]
where  and  are arbitrary positive numbers and  is a «small» positive scalar, fulfill the
first of the above-mentioned criteria. In effect, [26] characterizes a program of domestic tax
reforms entailing a non-uniform proportional convergence of t and T towards a common
structure H. The convergence is proportional because  and  represent the «size» of the
reform in each country. It is also non-uniform because this size may differ between coun-
tries.
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   	    	     	  As for the choice of the target vector as a type of average, this paper focuses on the pro-
cess of convergence towards a target vector which depends on the initial tax structures, t and
T, the local supply responses in each country, pp and PP, and the parameters  and .T o
be specific, the target vector is given by:
H =[ pp + PP]–1[ppt + PPT] [27]
whose interpretation becomes much clearer when it is rewritten as a matrix weighted average
of the existing tax structures in each country:
H = t +[ IN – ]T [28]
where the «weight» for the home country’s structure is the matrix  =[ pp + PP]–1 pp.
Note that the family of reforms [26]-[28] includes that analyzed in López-García (1996),
which, in turn, is the counterpart under the origin principle of the reform suggested by Keen
(1987, 1989) where taxes are levied on a destination basis. These authors analyze a uniform
(i.e.,  =  = 1) proportional convergence of domestic taxes towards a common structure
which depends on initial taxes and the local demand responses (Keen, destination principle)
and the local supply responses (López-García, origin principle) 3.
There are two particular cases in which [26]-[27] can have an intuitive interpretation. In
the first one, when local supply responses are the same at the starting point, i.e., pp = PP,
the target vector becomes H = t +( 1–)T, i.e., a convex combination of t and T, where the
weights are  = /( + ) for the home country and (1 – )=/( + ) for the foreign one.
In the second one, when there are no cross effects in production, i.e., when pp and PP are
diagonal matrices whose elements ii and ii on the principal diagonal are positive, the ele-
ments of H are also a weighted average of those of t and T. In effect, under these conditions,
we get Hi = iti +( 1–i)Ti, where the weights are now different for each commodity, and are
given by i = ii/(ii + ii) for the home country’s tax and (1 – i)=ii/(ii + ii)
for the foreign’s one.
Figure 1 provides an illustration of the two cases discussed in the previous paragraph in
the three-good case, two of them taxed (goods 1 and 2) and the untaxed numeraire (good 0).
Besides throwing light on the harmonizing features of the reforms under discussion, this fig-
ure allows us to observe the differences to the rule advanced in Keen (1987, 1989) under the
destination principle and its counterpart under the origin principle discussed in López-García
(1996). Without loss of generality, the initial tax structures are those associated with points t
and T, where the home country has a higher (lower) tax on good 2 (good 1). When the local
supply responses are identical, the target vector in Keen is H = (1/2)(t+T) at point HA, which
is in midway between t and T. However, with [27] and [28], any point on the tT segment
is eligible to be the target vector. When there are no cross effects in production, the target
vector in Keen is a weighted average of ti and Ti, the weights being ii/(ii + ii) and ii/
/(ii + ii), thus generating one point in the «harmonizing box» taTb. Under [27] and [28],
for given values of  and , a point also appears in the taTb box, but it is now possible to
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other words, both HB and HC are potential target vectors now, and the harmonizing reforms
are illustrated by various arrows 4.
A simple manipulation allows us to check that the family of reforms [26]-[28] imply that
the following expression holds:
ppdt + PPdT =0 N [29]
whose substitution in [9] gives rise to dq =0 N. Therefore, given the assumption that there are
no income effects for the taxed goods, the harmonizing reforms under examination keep rel-
ative world consumer prices unchanged.
Using [29] it can also be shown that the reforms [26]-[28] imply:
–[tppdt + TPPdT]=[t – T][t – T]>0 [30]
where  = PP. To check the positivity of the right hand side in [30] we have only
to demonstrate that the matrix  is positive definite. This is so because it can be rewritten as
 = PP[pp + PP]–1 pp = [(1/) pp
1 + (1/) PP
1 ]–1, which is clearly positive defi-
nite.
6. Indirect tax harmonization as a potential Pareto-improvement
We can now turn to some welfare and revenue effects of the family of harmonizing re-
forms [26]-[28]. This section will focus on the case where international transfers are feasible,
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tax on 1whereas the situation in which these transfers are not admissible will be analyzed in section
7. To begin with it, note that since the reforms entail dq = 0, [14] and [15] become:
eudu = –[(1–)pdt + (1–)PdT] [31]
dg0 = [(1–)p – ppt]dt + [(1–)P – PPT]dT [32]
The addition of the left hand sides in [31] and [32] can be interpreted as the variation in a
«home country’s social welfare function» whose arguments are u and g0. On the one hand,
eudu is the income equivalent of the change in the home country’s consumer utility, and, on
the other hand, dg0 provides a measure of the impact of the reform on the home country’s
government tax revenue. Since the positions of both the foreign country’s consumer and
government are kept unchanged through the international transfers dz0 and dm0 that may be
required, the expression eudu + dg0 can be said that encompasses both the welfare and reve-
nue effects of the harmonizing reform. The next step is to show that these effects are strictly
positive. This is the case, since adding [31] and [32] and using [30] we obtain:
eudu + dg0 = [t – T][t – T]=– [ tppdt + TPPdT]>0 [33]
Notice that this argument applies to any arbitrary initial position, thus including those where
the starting point is a Nash equilibrium. Thus we have:
Proposition 1: Starting from any arbitrary initial position, the family of harmonizing reforms
[26]-[28], implying a non-uniform proportional convergence of all domestic tax structures to-
wards a target vector which depends on initial taxes, local supply responses and some arbi-
trary positive scalars  and , can be said to be a potential Pareto-improvement in the sense
that eudu + dg0 >0 .
In other words, in so far as the welfare of the foreign country’s consumer and its government
consumption of the numeraire good are kept unchanged through the appropriate international
transfers, the addition of the income equivalent of the home country’s consumer welfare and
the change in his/her government tax revenue after the reform [26]-[28], is strictly positive.
This result is parallel to that advanced in López-García (1998) under the destination
principle in a similar model where the governments use their revenue to finance the purchase
of goods, and extends a proposition in López-García (1996) for the origin principle in a
framework where the revenue is returned to the consumers as lump-sum transfers. The un-
derlying intuition is not very different from that in Keen (1987, 1989). When income effects
are excluded, [29] assures that world consumer prices are unaffected. In turn, this implies
that world aggregate demand, eq + Eq + g + G, will not be changed, as neither will world sup-
ply, p + P. The only effect is then a «reallocation» of production between the producers in
both countries, which translates into an increased value of eudu + dg0.
Notice also that the extent of Proposition 1 is, in a sense, limited. It only says that du
and/or dg0 will be positive. Put another way, both u and g0 may increase after the reform, but
this does not exclude situations in which the home country’s consumer welfare is higher
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case that there is no variation in g0, so that the only effect of the reform is to generate a wel-
fare gain to the home country’s consumer. This could be considered as the counterpart, in the
present model, of Proposition 2 in Delipalla (1997), in the sense that the reform would fulfill
her «conditional revenue neutrality» 5.
Figure 2 illustrates the case where N = 1. It depicts the supply curves of a given com-
modity by two countries, p(.) and P(.). The demand side is not explicitly modelled, as the
harmonizing reforms imply that the world consumer price, q, is kept unaffected. For given
taxes, t and T, levied according to the origin principle, the producer prices in each country
are p = q – t and P = q – T, and the conventional measures of excess burden in each of them
can be represented by ABC and DEF respectively. Since harmonization entails no change in
aggregate consumption, aggregate production will not change either. As a consequence, the
new producer prices in each country, q –( t +  t) and q –( T +  T), associated with a reform
such that |T]>|  t|, will generate changes in each country’s production that verify  y =–  Y,
where y and Y denote the quantities produced in each country. It can thus be seen that the re-
duction in excess burden in the high tax country, FEIJ, is greater than the increase in excess
burden in the low tax country, HGBC. Therefore, there is a gain in aggregate welfare that can
be approximated by the area FEIJ – HGBC = GEIB.
20 MIGUEL-ÁNGEL LÓPEZ-GARCÍA













q–( t+ t ) 
q–( T+ T ) 







B7. Indirect tax harmonization as an actual Pareto-improvement
We can now turn to the case where international transfers are not feasible and discuss
whether the family of harmonizing reforms under examination may generate an actual
Pareto-improvement, i.e., a situation in which both countries are better off without any need
for offsetting transfers between them.
Since the reform ensures that dq = 0, [16] and [18] imply the following expressions for
the home country:
eudu = –(1–)p dt [34]
dg0 = [(1–)p – ppt] dt [35]
as well as [17] and [19] give similar ones for the foreign one. Taking into account that the addi-
tion of the left hand sides in [34] and [35] can be interpreted as the variation in a «home coun-
try’s social welfare function» whose arguments are u and g0, and making an analogous inter-
pretation for the foreign country, the change in each country’s welfare can be measured as:
eudu + dg0 =– tppdt [36]
EudU + dG0 =– TPPdT [37]
Using [26] and [28] and after some manipulations, [36] can be rewritten as:
eudu + dg0 = t t – t T [38]
Since, as discussed above, the matrix  is positive definite, it is clear that t t will be po-
sitive for any initial tax structure prevailing in the home country. However, there is no rea-
son to expect any determinate sign of t T, with the implication that, in general, the sign of
eudu + dg0 in [38] will be ambiguous.
Since the sign of t T is uncertain when the starting point is any arbitrary position, the
approach followed by Keen (1989) and López-García (1996) entails focusing on initial posi-
tions which are Nash equilibria. In fact, these authors show that «exceptional» situations ex-
ist under which, when the starting point is a Nash equilibrium, the harmonizing reforms (un-
der the destination principle in Keen and under the origin principle in López-García) are
actually Pareto improving, so that each country is better off without any need for interna-
tional transfers. In their models, however, tax revenue is returned to the individuals as a
lump-sum transfer, so we must check whether or not their propositions can be extended to
the present framework.
Using [24] and [25], the Nash-equilibrium tax structures in each country, tN and TN, can
be written as:
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One can manipulate in these expressions to provide the case analyzed in López-García
(1996), where revenue is returned to the consumers, and there is only a terms-of-trade effect
when governments deploy their tax structures. If we force  =  = 0, and making g = G =0 N
in [39] and [40], the corresponding Nash equilibrium taxes, ~ tN and ~ TN, verify:
~ [] [] te Np p q p 
	     1 [41]
~ [] [ ] TE NP P q P 
	     1
[42]
López-García (1996) then shows that~ tN~ TN is negative under certain «exceptional» condi-
tions, so that the counterpart of [38] (with dg0 = 0) is positive. These conditions refer to ei-
ther: (i) local supply responses which are identical at the initial position, i.e., pp = PP;o r
(ii) there are no cross effects in production or consumption, i.e., the matrices eqq, Eqq, pp y
PP are all diagonal 6.
Unfortunately, this does not seem to be a promising avenue of research in the present
context. Indeed, it is clear from mere inspection that tN TN will have any sign, even under
the «exceptional» situations (i) and (ii) above. This allows one to put forward the following:
Proposition 2: Starting from any arbitrary initial position, the family of harmonizing reforms
[26]-[28], implying a non-uniform proportional convergence of all domestic tax structures to-
wards a target vector which depends on initial taxes, local supply responses and some arbi-
trary positive scalars  and , will not in general entail an actual Pareto improvement. The
same applies when the initial position is a Nash equilibrium, in contrast to models where tax
revenue is returned to the consumers as a lump-sum transfer.
In fact, it seems that the most we can expect concerning the reforms [26]-[28] is to char-
acterize them as a potential Pareto-improvement. Adding [36] and [37] one gets:
(eudu + dg0)+( EUdU + dG0)=– [ tppdt + TPPdT]=[t – T][t – T]>0 [43]
whose interpretation is, in essence, the same as with [33]. In effect, the multilateral tax re-
form implies an increase in the value of the «supranational social welfare function» implic-
itly given in the left hand side of [43]. In fact, this expression only says that the addition of
the income equivalents of both country’s consumers’ welfare variations and the revenue
changes experienced by both governments, is strictly positive. It says nothing, however,
about whether any specific term is positive. In this way, [33] has the advantage of focusing
on the role of the international transfers between consumers and governments required for
one country to be better off without the other one being worse off.
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 	 	   	  	 	 8. Concluding comments
The aim of this paper has been to discuss some propositions referring to the effects on
consumer welfare and government revenue arising from a family of multilateral indirect tax
reforms than can be labelled as harmonizing when taxes are levied according to the origin
principle. It has been shown that the characterization of these policies as a potential
Pareto-improvement that has been widely analyzed in models where taxes are imposed on a
destination basis and where tax revenue is returned to the individuals as a transfer, can, when
properly reformulated, be extended to a framework where taxes are levied on an origin basis
and where the governments use their revenue to finance the purchase of goods and services.
This result, however, depends on a number of restrictive assumptions. Some of these are
considered standard in literature on indirect tax harmonization, but are rather unrealistic.
This is notably the case with the omission in the analysis of the distributional effects among
different consumers within a given country in addition to the assumption that international
transfers between consumers of different countries are feasible.
It must be stressed here however that the important issue from a policy point of view is
whether strict Pareto-improvements from tax harmonization can exist when the governments
have to finance public goods provision or face revenue requirements that should be financed
through indirect taxation, and the possibility of international transfers is excluded. The re-
sults of this paper suggest a negative answer, at least according to the model under discus-
sion. There may, of course, exist harmonizing policies that would make all the involved
countries better off without any need for offsetting international transfers, but the informa-
tional requirements as well as the associated implementation obstacles cast doubts on their
practical feasibility.
Notes
1. The model is similar to that used in López-García (1998) to discuss indirect tax harmonization under the
destination principle. However, the role of the international transfer between governments, m0, is slightly
different.
2. The present model is, however, simpler, in that it excludes both the interdependence with the «rest of the
world» (for example, third countries) and some institutional features related to the existence of a «supranatio-
nal» government (for example, purchases of agricultural products).
3. It should be noted that Keen (1989: 7) himself suggests a program of non-uniform harmonizing reforms not
different from [26], but he ends up focusing on the uniform case.
4. It can easily be shown that the admissible values of the weights when N = 2 fulfill the following expression:
The situation analyzed by Keen is that where these ratios are equal to one.
5. Delipalla (1997) focuses on Keen’s (1987, 1989) reform under the destination principle. She characterizes a
reform as «conditionally revenue neutral» if it is revenue-neutral at constant international producer prices (p.
458). In our model, since taxes are levied according to the origin principle, «conditional revenue neutrality»
should be interpreted in terms of constant international consumer prices.
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   6. In essence, the proof consists of showing that can be rewritten as –y y, where y is a vector and the
matrix  is positive definite. It should also be noted that López-García (1996) carries out his analysis in terms
of revenue (or restricted profit) functions, but this does not affect the results.
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NN tT   Resumen
En este trabajo se discute si algunas proposiciones referidas a los efectos de la armonización fiscal indirecta que se
han derivado cuando los impuestos se gravan sobre la base del principio de destino y la recaudación se devuelve a los
consumidores en forma de transferencia, pueden, convenientemente reformuladas, extenderse a un marco en que el
principio impositivo es el de origen y los gobiernos usan sus ingresos fiscales para comprar bienes y servicios. Usan-
do un modelo de dos países, se argumenta que una convergencia proporcional no uniforme de los impuestos de cada
país en la dirección de una estructura impositiva «promedia» diseñada de forma adecuada, puede caracterizarse
como un cambio potencialmente Pareto-superior. Sin embargo, estas reformas no darán lugar, en general, a una me-
jora paretiana estricta en que todos los países mejoran sin necesidad de arbitrar transferencias entre ellos.
Palabras clave: armonización fiscal indirecta, principio de origen, reforma de la imposición sobre mercancías.
Clasificación JEL: F15, H87.
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